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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-PHYSICAL CONDITION-DISABILI-
TY-CLAIMANT's BURDEN OF PROOF-The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a claimant must prove a change in his or
her physical condition only in cases where the employer would
have to prove the same.
Dillon v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich
Colliers), 640 A.2d 386 (Pa. 1994).
Thomas Dillon (the "Claimant") was an employee' of Green-
wich Colliers (the "Employer").2 The Claimant was eligible to
collect workers' compensation benefits, pursuant to the Pennsyl-
vania Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), 3 because he sus-
tained an injury to his lower back in the scope of his employ-
ment.4 Pursuant to a notice of compensation payable,5 the
1. The Workers' Compensation Act defines an employee as a:
[S]ervant, and includes all natural persons who perform services for another
for valuable consideration, exclusive of persons whose employment is casual in
character and not in the regular course of business of the employer, and ex-
clusive of persons to whom articles or materials are given out to be made up,
cleaned, washed, altered, ornamented, finished or repaired, or adapted for sale
in the worker's own home, or on other premises, not under control or manage-
ment of the employer.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 22 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
2. Dillon v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Collieries),
640 A.2d 386, 387 (Pa. 1994). The Workers' Compensation Act defines an employer
as "synonymous with master, and includes natural persons, partnerships, joint-stock
companies, corporations for profit ... municipal corporations, the Commonwealth,
and all governmental agencies created by it." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 21.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1603 (1992 & Supp. 1994). The name of the
Act was changed from "Workmen's Compensation" to "Workers' Compensation" by
amendment in 1993. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1.
4. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. For purposes of workers' compensation, the em-
ployee is considered within the scope of employment when he or she is "actually
engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon
the employer's premises or elsewhere." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1).
5. Upon notice given by the employee, an employer may voluntarily agree to
pay the employee benefits pursuant to the Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 731. The
Act provides:
Where payment of compensation is commenced without an agreement, the em-
ployer or insurer shall simultaneously give notice of compensation payable to
the employee . .. on a form prescribed by the department, identifying such
payments as compensation under this act and shall forthwith furnish a copy
or copies to the department as required by the rules and regulations.
Id.
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Claimant was paid total disability.' By signing a final receipt,7
the Claimant acknowledged termination of his compensation.'
The parties assented to a supplemental agreement.' Under the
agreement the Claimant was entitled to compensation amount-
ing to thirteen days of work.10 Two months later, the Claimant
again injured his back, and received compensation which contin-
ued until he returned to work early the next year."
Upon his return to work, the Claimant reinjured his back."
Due to his inability to work, the Claimant filed a claim peti-
tion, 3 which was later amended to a reinstatement petition. 4
After a hearing on the merits of the case, the referee" awarded
the claimant compensation for partial disability."8 At the hear-
ing, the Claimant stipulated that work was available within his
6. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. The statute does not define total disability. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 511. Courts have held that an award of total disability was
appropriate in cases where the employer could not prove that there was work avail-
able within the claimant's physical capabilities. See Schmidt v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeal Board (Fetch), 594 A.2d 812, 815-16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
7. A "final receipt" is a mutual agreement between the parties reciting that
the employer has paid and the claimant has received all benefits due under the
award. McGahen v. General Electric, 177 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. 1962) (quoting Glen Alden
Corp. v. Tomchick 130 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957)). This definition was not
included in the Act.
8. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. This final receipt became effective on May 30,
1978. Id.
9. The Claimant received compensation from August 30, 1978 through Sep-
tember 11, 1978. Id. The Act allows parties to make a supplemental agreement
when the claimant's status changes. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 732. The statute
provides that:
[A]ny party . . . at any time after such agreement has been approved by this
department or after the expiration of the time allowed for an appeal . . . or
order, may file . . . a certified copy of such supplemental agreement . . . and
it shall thereupon be the duty of the prothonotary to modify ... such ...
agreement....
Id. § 934.
10. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387.
11. Id. The Claimant received compensation from the date of his injury of
November 15, 1978 through January 21, 1979, when he returned to work. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The Act requires that "laIll proceedings before any referee shall be
instituted by a claim petition .... [AII claim petitions shall be in writing and in
the form prescribed by the department." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 711.
14. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. A referee may:
[Miodify, reinstate, suspend, or terminate a notice of compensation payable, an
original or supplemental agreement, or an award . . . upon petition filed by
either party . . . upon proof that the disability of an injured employee has
increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or finally ceased....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772.
15. Prior to the 1993 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act, Workers
Compensation Judges were designated as referees. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 701.
16. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. Partial disability is statutorily defined as that
which is less than total disability. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512.
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sedentary medical limitations. 7
Toward the end of the partial disability period, the Claimant
filed a review petition seeking to increase his compensation from
partial disability benefits to total disability benefits. 8 At the
hearing, the Claimant argued that, although his physical condi-
tion remained unchanged since the last hearing, the fact that he
was unable to find employment commensurate with his medical
limitations entitled him to total disability benefits.19 The
Claimant's physician, in his deposition, opined that the Claim-
ant could not perform the job he had on the date of his original
injury." The Employer argued that the Claimant was trying to
relitigate his original claim for total disability which could not
be accomplished through a modification petition.2
In spite of the Employer's argument, the referee awarded the
Claimant total disability as of January 15, 1992.22 The Employ-
er appealed, and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (the
"Board")" reversed and remanded the case because the deposi-
tion of the Employer's medical expert was not received into evi-
dence.24 On remand, the referee received the Employer's medi-
cal testimony and awarded the Claimant total disability.25 The
referee determined that the Claimant could not find a job within
his sedentary limitations and concluded that the Claimant was
not required to show that his compensable injury had changed
17. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. The court noted that the Claimant's stipulation of
available work did not extend beyond the date of the referee's decision dated June
20, 1980. Id. Benefits were set at $135.58 per week. Id. This figure was calculated
by subtracting the then current federal minimum wage of $2.20 per hour multiplied
by 40 hours per week ($116) from the claimant's average weekly wage of $319.38.
Id. This equation yielded $203.38. Id. The Workers' Compensation Act requires that
for partial disability, this figure be reduced to two-thirds of its value ($135.58). PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512.
18. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. The Claimant asserted at the August 3, 1983
hearing that he became totally disabled as of January 15, 1982. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The Claimant never appealed the original award to the Board. Id.
22. Id.
23. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board is a departmental administrative
board that is independent of the Department of Labor and Industry. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 701. Grounds for appeal to the Board are error of law or that the
referee's findings of fact were not supported by sufficient evidence. Id. § 853. The
proper appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board is a peti-
tion for review to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 702
(Supp. 1994).
24. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 387. The Board held that the referee had improperly
closed the record and rendered his decision without receiving the deposition of the
defense's medical expert. Id. at 388.
25. Id.
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since the decision granting partial disability." The Employer
appealed again to the Board, which held that the referee erred
as a matter of law in awarding the Claimant total disability.1
7
On remand from the Board, the referee made no new findings of
fact and, after applying the law as directed by the Board, dis-
missed the Claimant's modification petition."
The Board's decision was affirmed by the commonwealth
court.' The court held that in order for a petitioner to modify
an award or agreement, he must come forward with competent
evidence of a change in his physical condition since the date of
the award or agreement.3"
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur." The
issue before the court was whether a claimant receiving partial
disability workers' compensation benefits could meet the re-
quired burden of proof for a modification to total disability with-
out producing evidence of a change in physical condition. 2 The
Claimant argued that if the Employer had the right to modify
the agreement without showing any change in the Claimant's
physical condition, the Claimant should be afforded the same
right.
33
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania' focused on the fairness
of allowing a claimant to modify his disability without proving a
change in his physical condition.35 The court explained that a
consistent, flawed extension of a court's usage of the word dis-
ability in a prior case caused the present improper evaluation of
26. Id.
27. Id. at 388. The Board relied on a recent commonwealth court case. See
Mancini v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 440 A.2d 1275, 1276 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982). In Mancini, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that
the claimant, when petitioning for a modification of benefits, had the burden to
prove a change in his physical condition. Mancini, 440 A.2d at 1277.
28. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 388. On August 15, 1989, the Board affirmed the
referee's dismissal of the petition. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Dillon v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Greenwich Colliers), 626
A.2d 1160 (Pa. 1993). "Allocatur" means "it is allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75
(6th ed. 1990).
32. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 388.
33. Id. at 390. The Claimant relied on the commonwealth court's reasoning in
Lukens which stated, "it has long been established in the workmen's compensation
area that proof of a change in medical condition is not required when that is not
the basis for seeking a decrease in the benefits." Id. (quoting Lukens, Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Williams), 568 A.2d 981 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989), allocatur denied, 593 A.2d 426 (Pa. 1990)).
34. Justice Zappala authored the opinion for the court; there was no dissent.
Dillon, 640 A.2d at 386.
35. Id. at 391.
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the claimant's physical condition."6 The court concluded that
the term disability meant nothing more than the effect a work-
related injury had on the claimant's earning power."7
In support of this conclusion, the supreme court illustrated
that an award of partial disability was similar to a suspension of
benefits?8B The court explained that full disability benefits
awarded to a claimant could be suspended when it was estab-
lished that the claimant's disability no longer hindered his earn-
ing power. 9 The court noted that an employer's burden of proof
was satisfied by offering the claimant a job or securing him a
position that corresponded to his medical restrictions or limita-
tions in which he could earn at least the same wages as before
the original injury. ' The court held that the claimant's burden
of proof to lift the suspension and resume full disability benefits
could be met by proving that, through no fault of his own, the
claimant's earning capacity was adversely affected by the dis-
ability and that the factors originally necessitating the suspen-
sion were no longer present.41 The court reasoned that there
was no need for the claimant to prove an exacerbation of his
physical condition.' The court concluded that the Claimant, by
showing that it was impossible to find work within the limita-
tions, met the required burden of proof and should have been
granted the modification petition.'
Because the Claimant proved that his earning power was
negatively affected by the original injury in that he could not
36. Id. at 388 (citing Henderson v. Air Master Corp., 276 A.2d 581 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1971)). In Henderson, the claimant was receiving partial disability and,
toward the close of this period, filed a reinstatement petition seeking total disability
payments. Henderson, 276 A.2d at 582. The court held that the claimant was trying
to relitigate his original claim and dismissed it for failure to show a difference in
his disability from the original determination. Id. See notes 76-82 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Henderson.
37. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 391. The court drew the distinction between the origi-
nal physical injury and its effect on the injured employee's future ability to earn
money. Id.
38. Id. at 392. A suspension of benefits stops or reduces the employer's duty
to pay benefits to the claimant when the disability of the claimant has decreased.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772. The court relied on an earlier case to make this anal-
ogy. Id. (citing Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments, 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990)).
See notes 114-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pieper.
39. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 392 (quoting Pieper, 584 A.2d at 304).
40. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 392.
41. Id. The court in Pieper explained that the claimant's disability was caused
by his original injury because the connection was established during the original
claim, coupled with the fact that the suspension of benefits never suggested a termi-
nation of the employer's liability. See Pieper, 584 A.2d at 305.
42. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 393 (quoting Pieper, 584 A.2d at 304).
43. Dillon, 640 A.2d at 393.
1995
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find work within his physical limitations, the supreme court
reversed the commonwealth court's order affirming the Board."
The supreme court reinstated the referee's decision and awarded
the Claimant total disability."
The Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act46 is a forced
bargain between the employer and the employee, whereby the
employer gives up the affirmative defenses of assumption of the
risk, contributory or comparative negligence, and injury by a
fellow servant, while the employee surrenders his right to sue
the employer in tort.47 The Act requires an injured party to
prove: (1) an employment relationship; (2) an injury; (3) that the
injury occurred during the course of employment; and (4) that
the injury related to the employment.' The Act allows a
Workers' Compensation judge to alter the claimant's benefits
when either party proves a change in the claimant's disabili-
ty.49 The purpose of this section was to make the award of ben-
efits flexible enough to be modified if the employee's disability
status changed after an award has been ordered.5'
The first Pennsylvania case addressing the issue of a
claimant's ability to modify his compensation under the Act was
Zuro v. McClintic Marshall Co.5 In Zuro, the claimant, a struc-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1603. The Workers' Compensation Act applies
"to all injuries occurring within this Commonwealth, irrespective of the place where
the contract for hiring was made, renewed, extended, and extraterritorially as pro-
vided." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1.
47. See Hinton v. Waste Techniques Corp., 364 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976). See generally David B. Torrey, Time Limitations in the Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act and Occupational Disease Acts: Theoretical Doctrine and
Current Applications, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 975, 978 (1986). While the employee relin-
quished the right of a common law action against the employer, the employee was
not barred from prosecuting actions against third persons for wrongs committed
against him at work. See Grant v. GAF Corp., 608 A.2d 1047, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (citing Mays v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963)).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1). The Act excludes certain occurrences from
eligibility for compensation, namely, self-inflicted injury or death and violation of the
law. id. § 431.
49. Id. § 772. The Act provides that a Workers' Compensation judge:
[M]ay modify . . . an award ... upon petition filed by either party . . upon
proof that the disability of an injured employe has increased ... provid-
ed . .. where compensation has been suspended because the employe's earn-
ings are equal to or in excess of his wages prior to the injury that payments
under the ... award may be resumed at any time during the period for
which the compensation for partial disability is payable, unless it be shown
that the loss of earnings does not result from the disability due to the injury.
Id.
50, See Leeper v. Logan Iron & Steel Co., 198 A. 489, 492 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1938).
51. 195 A. 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937).
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tural steelworker, broke his left leg while on the job and subse-
quently entered into a voluntary compensation agreement with
his employer. 2 The employee petitioned to modify the agree-
ment, and the employer petitioned to terminate it in the sum-
mer of 1930.' Before the referee ruled on the petitions, the
parties executed a supplemental agreement, which provided that
the employer would pay the claimant partial disability bene-
fits.' The claimant then tried to modify the supplemental
agreement." The court, in denying the claimant's appeal, held
that even if the claimant's leg injury prevented him from work-
ing, he was required to prove that his injury affected more than
just his leg.5"
The court based its decision on the schedule of benefits for a
specific loss.57 The court interpreted the statute to be the exclu-
sive remedy for all the costs incurred through a specific loss,
including pain and loss of employment, "whether it be total,
partial, or no incapacity at all."58 Therefore, in order for the
claimant to prevail on a petition for modification, the claimant
had the burden of proving an extension of the injury.5"
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Hendricks v.
Patterson' employed a similar analysis in deciding a claimant's
petition for modification of court-awarded partial disability bene-
fits."l In Hendricks, the parties entered into an agreement re-
quiring the employer to pay the claimant total disability. 2 The
employer successfully petitioned for modification from total dis-
ability to partial disability.' Four years later, the claimant al-
52. Zuro, 195 A. at 160.
53. Id.
54. Id. The employer agreed to pay the claimant $15 per week for 215 weeks.
Id.
55. Id. The claimant alleged he was totally disabled because he tried working
for three summers, but still experienced a great deal of pain and swelling in both
legs. Id. at 160-61.
56. Id. at 161.
57. Zuro, 195 A. at 161. Here the specific loss was the use of the claimant's
leg. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 513 (1992).
58. Zuro, 195 A. at 162 (quoting Gardner v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 186 A. 410
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1936)).
59. Zuro, 195 A. at 161-62.
60. 67 A.2d 652 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949). Appeals from state administrative agen-
cies, including the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, are now heard by the com-
monwealth court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 763(a)(1); 5105(a)(2) (1981).
61. Hendricks, 67 A.2d at 653. On August 23, 1938, while working for the
employer, the claimant fell off a ladder and broke his left hip. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The modification order was effective on May 13, 1942 and provided
that the employer would pay the claimant total disability through February 27,
1942, and partial disability of 75% thereafter. Id.
1995
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leged that his disability increased from partial to total disabili-
ty." The claimant's modification petition was granted, and the
employer was directed to resume paying total disability." In af-
firming the referee's allowance of the petition for modification,
the superior court held that the question of whether a disability
was partial or total was one of fact." While maintaining that a
claimant had to meet the required burden when seeking to mod-
ify the compensation benefits, the court reasoned that the claim-
ant carried that burden by showing that other parts of his body,
other than his hip, were permanently disabled as a result of the
original injury."7 The court concluded that it was a change in
the claimant's physical condition, not his inability to find em-
ployment, that allowed him to seek a modification of his bene-
fits."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Petrone v. Moffat Coal
Co.,' announced the criterion for determining total disabili-
ty.70 In Petrone, the claimant filed a claim petition for compen-
sation pursuant to the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease
Act,71 alleging that he was totally disabled.72 The court rea-
soned that if the claimant could not perform the sort of manual
labor he did prior to contracting anthracosilicosis, he was with-
64. Id. On September 3, 1946, the claimant petitioned for modification. Id.
65. Id. at 653.
66. Hendricks, 67 A.2d at 653.
67. Id. at 654.
68. Id.
69. 233 A.2d 891 (Pa. 1967).
70. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 892.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1201-1603 (1992 & Supp. 1994)).
72. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 892. The claimant worked in a coal mine for thirty-
three years. Id. The claimant alleged he was totally disabled from anthracosilicosis.
Id. Anthracosilicosis is defined as a mixture of anthracosis and silicosis. DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 96 (27th ed. 1988). Anthracosis is a lung disease
caused by inhaling coal dust into the lungs. Id. Silicosis is an inflammation in the
lungs caused by inhaling dust containing silicon dioxide. Id. at 1527.
The referee found that the claimant was totally disabled and ordered the
employer to pay the claimant total disability benefits. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 893. The
Board reversed, because there was expert testimony indicating that the claimant
could do light work of a general nature. Id.
On appeal, the superior court set forth a presumption that when a claimant
was able to do light work of a general nature, such work existed; therefore, the
claimant who could do light work could never be totally disabled. Id.
The supreme court disagreed with the presumption and held that the fact
that the claimant was able to do a certain level of work did not suggest that such
work was available. Id. at 894. The court criticized the superior court's presumption
with the following analogy, "the fact that one is a swimmer does not legally or fac-
tually presume that there is available a river or even a swimming pool in the com-
munity in which he may swim.' Id.
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out earning power and therefore was totally disabled.73 The
court further asserted that the claimant should never be re-
quired to solicit every employer in the community for a position
within his physical limitations.74 The supreme court concluded
that if such work were available, it would be more practical for
the employer to prove its availability, rather than compelling the
claimant to prove that no such work existed."
Despite the supreme court's decision in Petrone, Pennsylvania
courts continued to place the burden of proof on claimants who
were petitioning for modification, as evidenced by the common-
wealth court's decision in Henderson v. Air Master Corp.7" In
Henderson, the referee determined that the claimant was fifty
percent disabled and ordered the employer to pay partial disabil-
ity.77 After the period of partial disability expired, the injured
claimant filed a reinstatement petition alleging that he was
totally disabled.7" The referee granted the claimant's petition,
but was subsequently reversed by the Board.79
On appeal, the commonwealth court focused on whether the
claimant was attempting to relitigate the percentage of the dis-
ability that was caused by the original injury.s As in
Hendricks, the court concluded that, in order to prevent a myri-
ad of litigation by claimants seeking to increase their percentage
of disability, a claimant seeking to relitigate his partial disabili-
ty award had to prove a change in his physical condition."' The
court noted that the Board had determined that there was no
73. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 895.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court remanded the case for a determination as to whether such
light duty work was available for the claimant. Id.
76. 276 A.2d 581 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971).
77. Henderson, 276 A.2d at 582. The referee ordered partial disability on No-
vember 28, 1959 to continue for 350 weeks, ending on August 12, 1966. Id. At the
time, this was the maximum number of weeks authorized under the Act. Id. The
period of partial disability is currently 500 weeks. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512.
78. Henderson, 276 A.2d at 582. Neither the Board nor the commonwealth
court addressed the issue of whether the claimant was able to find suitable employ-
ment. Id.
79. Id. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia affirmed the Board's de-
cision and the claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Id.
80. Id. In Henderson, the court further determined that a "disability" required
a change in physical condition. Id. at 582.
81. Id. The court refused to consider the issue of whether a claimant could
relitigate his percentage of disability by showing that there was no suitable employ-
ment available to him. Id. While the commonwealth court acknowledged the supreme
court's decision in Petri~ne, the court reasoned that it was not applicable because the
issue in this case involved a change in the percentage of disability, and not the
availability of employment that the claimant could perform. Id.
1995
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evidence that the claimant's disability had changed.82 The com-
monwealth court therefore affirmed.'
In Airco-Speer Electronics v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board,' the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a
claimant's inability to find work within his medical limitations,
without a change in his physical condition, was not enough to
modify his benefits." In Airco-Speer, the parties entered into
an agreement whereby the employer would pay the claimant
total disability benefits.' Later that year, the claimant filed a
successful modification petition, resulting in an order for total
disability. 7 The referee ordered total disability effective Octo-
ber 6, 1972, and the Board affirmed."
On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed, and held that
the claimant's unsuccessful attempt to work was not enough to
warrant an increase in benefits to total disability.' The court
asserted that unless the claimant could prove a change in physi-
cal condition, there could not be a change of the original
award.0 The court noted that otherwise, claimants might re-
peatedly file frivolous modification petitions after receiving unfa-
vorable awards to circumvent the appellate process.9'
In Cerny v. Schrader & Seyfried, Inc.,92 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania clarified the claimant's burden of proof to success-
fully modify an award.' In Cerny, the claimant petitioned for
82. Id. at 583.
83. Henderson, 276 A.2d at 583.
84. 333 A.2d 508 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
85. Airco-Speer, 333 A.2d at 509. The claimant was an employee for over nine-
teen years. Id. The claimant injured her back while at work. Id.
86. Id. The agreement was made shortly after the claimant's August 20, 1970
injury and the payments were at a weekly rate of $60. Id. The employer later un-
successfully petitioned for termination; however, the referee granted a modification of
the agreement to reflect partial disability. Id. The employer petitioned to terminate
benefits on February 2, 1972. Id. The referee ordered partial disability on August 2,
1972. Id.
87. Id. The claimant filed the petition for modification on October 18, 1972.
Id. The claimant attempted to perform a position that the referee, who originally
awarded her partial disability, concluded was within her limitations. Id. The com-
monwealth court concluded that the second referee, who awarded her total disability,
merely had a difference in opinion with the former, and that was not cause for
relitigation of her disability. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Airco-Speer, 333 A.2d at 510. The court noted that the claimant petitioned
for modification just two months after the award. Id.
91. Id.
92. 342 A.2d 384 (Pa. 1975).
93. Cerny, 342 A.2d at 385. The claimant was seriously injured when a sewer
trench, in which he was working, collapsed upon him. Id. The parties agreed that
the claimant would receive total disability until he returned to work. Id. The claim-
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modification to total disability after the close of the partial dis-
ability period awarded by the referee.' The supreme court held
that the claimant seeking to modify an already expired partial
disability award into a total disability award had to prove an
increase in disability.' The court explained that it had to bal-
ance two sides in modification proceedings." First, the claimant
had to prove that there was both an increase in the disability
since the partial disability award and that the claimant could
not perform the pre-injury job.97 Second, the court found that
the employer could thwart the claimant's petition merely by
proving that there was work available within the claimant's
medical limitations." The court concluded that where the em-
ployer could find work within a claimant's physical limitations,
the claimant could not receive total disability.'
In Mancini v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,"ce the
commonwealth court addressed the issue of deterioration of
disability."0 ' In Mancini, after the parties agreed that the em-
ployer would pay the claimant total disability benefits, the em-
ployer filed a termination petition, alleging that the claimant
refused reasonable medical services." 2 The referee reduced the
claimant's benefits from total to partial disability.10 3 Just be-
ant was paid $47.50 weekly and returned to work on June 26, 1962. Id. After re-
turning to work, the claimant was assigned to a light duty job due to his injury. Id.
The claimant was laid off on September 21, 1962. Id. The employer peti-
tioned for termination on November 1, 1962 and alleged the claimant's disability
stopped on June 15, 1962, shortly more than a week before the claimant returned to
work. Id. The referee denied the employer's petition to terminate the claimant's
benefits, but modified them to 75% partial disability, effective September 21, 1962,
for 350 weeks, ending on June 5, 1969. Id.
94. Id. at 385. The claimant petitioned for modification on August 15, 1969.
Id. The referee denied the petition because the claimant was able to do light work.
Id. at 386. The Board reversed, holding that it was the defendant's duty to prove
that there was light duty work available to the claimant. Id.
The Board relied on a supreme court case which held that, because it was
more difficult to prove the non-existence of a job than it was to prove the existence
of one, it was the employer's burden to prove there was a job for the claimant. Id.
(citing Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 246 A.2d 668 (Pa. 1968)). Concluding that the
claimant failed to prove a change in his disability, the commonwealth court reversed.
Cerny, 342 A.2d at 386.
95. Cerny, 342 A.2d at 386.




100. 440 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
101. Mancini, 440 A.2d at 1278. The claimant fell off a ladder while working
for the employer. Id. at 1276.
102. Id.
103. Id. The medical services would have reduced the claimant's disability by
90%. Id. The agreement was made shortly after the injury in 1966. Id. The referee
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fore the claimant's partial disability ended, the claimant peti-
tioned for modification to total disability, alleging that he was
unable to work.' 4  The commonwealth court upheld the
claimant's modification because the claimant's evidence exhibit-
ed a deterioration of his physical condition.05 According to the
court, this determination of his physical condition meant that
the modification by the referee was proper."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Kachinski v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco Construction
Co.),0 7 outlined the procedure for an employer to modify the
claimant's disability benefits.' In Kachinski, the claimant was
injured while working as a mechanic for the employer. 09 The
supreme court, while noting that it was incumbent upon employ-
ers to make injured claimants whole, asserted that an employer
could not be held financially liable beyond the extent of the
claimant's injury."0 The court articulated the procedure for an
employer to compel employees to return to work."' First, the
employer had to prove that the claimant's physical condition had
improved."' Second, the employer had to prove there were
denied the termination petition, but reduced the claimant's status to partial disabili-
ty at the rate of 10% on February 17, 1970 because the claimant refused medical
care. Id.
104. Id. at 1277. The period of partial disability at the time was 350 weeks. Id.
The referee granted the claimant's petition and the Board reversed. Id.
105. Id. at 1278.
106. Mancini, 440 A.2d at 1278. The court did not discuss the issue of the
claimant's prior refusal to seek medical attention because that issue had already
been litigated at the modification hearing. Id.
107. 532 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1987).
108. Kachinski, 532 A.2d at 375.
109. Id. The claimant was working with a paint can that exploded, causing
burns on his face and causing him to fall, injuring his back. Id. The claimant was
awarded compensation for his facial burns, but not for his back injury. Id. The
claimant filed a review petition on April 9, 1981, seeking coverage for his back inju-
ry. Id. The employer filed a modification petition on September 24, 1981, alleging
that the claimant had sufficiently recovered to return to work on June 30, 1981. Id.
Hearing the two petitions together, the referee concluded that the claimant
had recovered from the facial injuries and that his back had improved to an extent
that he could do some of the jobs that the employer alleged he was capable of per-
forming. Id. at 376. The referee reduced the claimant's benefits from total disability
to partial disability. Id. This decision was affirmed by the Board. Id. The common-
wealth court reversed, and the claimant's benefits were reinstated. Id.
110. Id. at 379.
111. Id. at 380.
112. Id. Two years after this decision, the commonwealth court narrowed the
requirements of Kachinski by deciding that the employer did not have to prove a
change in the claimant's physical condition unless that was the basis for seeking a
decrease in benefits. See Lukens, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Williams), 568 A.2d 981, 983 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), allocatur denied, 593 A.2d 426
(Pa. 1990).
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available jobs in accordance with the claimant's physical limita-
tions."3 The claimant then had to demonstrate good faith by
applying for and attempting the job."' If the job referral did
not materialize, the court determined that the employer could
petition to modify the claimant's benefits."5
In Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division," the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the issue of modi-
fying partial disability benefits to total disability benefits, but
rather discussed how a claimant could lift a suspension of bene-
fits." 7 In Pieper, the issue before the court was whether a
claimant had to prove a causal connection between his present
disability and prior work-related injury in order to reinstate sus-
pended benefits." 8 The supreme court outlined the distinction
113. Kachinski, 532 A.2d at 380.
114. Id. If the claimant failed to make a good faith effort to secure the job, the
employer could use the failure as evidence to reduce the claimant's benefits. Id.
115. Id. The claimant's counsel did not inform his client of the availability of
the positions found by the employer. Id.
The court concluded that although such action could lead to both a modi-
fication action of the claimant's benefits and a subsequent malpractice action against
the attorney, it would excuse this claimant from the force of the law. Id. at 381.
At the modification hearing, the claimant verbally expressed an interest in
pursuing some of the jobs that the employer had suggested, but the claimant's attor-
ney and the referee told him not to follow-up on any of them. Id. However, the
opinion established that an employer could modify a claimant's benefits if he proved
a change in the employee's physical condition and showed that there was an appro-
priate job available for the employee to pursue. Id. at 380-81.
116. 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990).
117. The Dillon court later read the Act's definitions of "disability" and "injury"
as well as the requisite burdens of proof required of the employers and claimants in
light of Pieper, and held that the burden of proof for a modification, like a termi-
nation, should be equal as between employers and claimants. See Dillon, 640 A.2d at
392-93.
118. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 302. The claimant was a mechanical assembler for the
employer. Id. at 303. The claimant alleged that, during the course of his employ-
ment, he fell and received a herniated a disk in his back. Id. at 302. The claimant
was injured on October 8, 1982. Id. The employer paid the claimant total disability
benefits pursuant to a notice of compensation payable that was dated December 6,
1982, and these payments stopped when the claimant executed a final receipt upon
his return to work on April 11, 1983. Id.
Just over a week after his return to work, the claimant had a recurrence of
his original back injury. Id. Thereafter, he entered into a supplemental agreement
with the employer, which provided for a reinstatement of his total disability benefits.
Id. When the claimant returned to part-time employment with the employer on May
31, 1983, his benefits were reduced to partial disability by another supplemental
agreement. Id. When the claimant returned to work full-time on June 21, 1983, his
disability benefits were terminated pursuant to yet another supplemental agreement.
Id. The claimant did not receive any workers' compensation benefits during this six-
month period beginning June 23, 1983, when he was laid off. Id. at 302 n.5. The
claimant filed a reinstatement petition on September 18, 1984. Id. at 303. The
claimant alleged a change in his physical condition as of January 25, 1984. Id. The
referee granted the claimant's reinstatement petition and lifted the suspension of the
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between a termination of benefits and a suspension of bene-
fits." '9 The court explained that a termination of benefits dis-
charged the employer's liability to provide the claimant with any
further disability benefits.' A termination meant that all of
the claimant's disability had ceased.' The court distinguished
a suspension from a termination and held that a claimant did
not need to prove the causal connection between the present
disability and the original work-related injury when petitioning
to lift a suspension of benefits because a suspension never sug-
gested that the claimant's disability had ceased.'22 The court
determined that a suspension, unlike a termination, was sup-
ported only by a finding or agreement that the claimant's earn-
ing power was not restricted by the original injury.2 '
The supreme court asserted that the commonwealth court
used the wrong test when it determined that the claimant was
not qualified to have his benefits reinstated. 24 Because there
was no proof that a termination was effective in this case, the
claimant's benefits had been suspended and the claimant had
met his burden of proof for reinstating his benefits. 2' The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania held that a claimant who was not
claimant's benefits. Id. The referee concluded that the claimant was totally disabled
from doing his pre-injury job, or any similar job, and that his present disability was
the result of his original work-related injury. Id.
The Board affirmed and the employer appealed to the commonwealth court,
arguing that the claimant neither showed a deterioration of his condition, nor proved
a causal connection between the present disability and the previous work-related
injury. Id. The commonwealth court reversed, holding that the claimant was required
to prove that a causal connection did, in fact, exist. Id.
119. Id. at 303-04.
120. Id. at 304.
121. Id. A termination of benefits was supported by a finding or agreement
that all of the claimant's disability stemming from a work-related injury had ceased,
or that the parties had come to a settlement, which released the employer from any
further liability to the employee. Id. The court stated that a claimant seeking a
reinstatement of terminated benefits needed to establish the causal connection be-
tween his present disability and the prior compensable injury. Id.
122. Id.
123. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 305. The suspension of benefits did not involve any
stipulation as to the claimant's recovery or change in physical condition. Id. Unlike
a termination, a suspension created the presumption that the claimant's physical
condition remained the same and that the employer did not contest the causal con-
nection; therefore, the employer's liability did not change. Id.
Because the suspension of benefits merely established that the claimant's
earning power was no longer impeded, evidence that the claimant's earning power
was again restricted due to his disability, was sufficient to lift the suspension. Id.
124. Id. at 306.
125. Id. There was no conclusive proof that there had been a termination of
benefits because no final receipt was executed; there was only a supplemental agree-
ment between the parties. Id. The court noted that the claimant met his burden of
proof mainly through expert testimony. Id.
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receiving benefits could petition to receive benefits without
showing a change in his physical condition."
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in Spinabelli v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Massey Buick, Inc.), 27
maintained that the claimant had to prove a change in his phys-
ical condition, if he manifested bad faith in his attempts to find
suitable employment, in order to reinstate total disability bene-
fits. " In Spinabelli, the claimant was receiving compensation
when the employer successfully petitioned for modification, al-
leging that it had offered the claimant a position within his
physical restrictions, which the claimant did not try to per-
form. 2' The commonwealth court concluded that in cases
where a claimant initially manifested bad faith, and later re-
nounced the decision not to accept the position, the claimant
would be required to prove that the disability had increased and
that the claimant was unable to perform the employer's previ-
ously proffered position.3'
The Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to
help the worker obtain the remuneration he needed to pay medi-
cal bills and other expenses causally related to an injury re-
ceived at work. 3' Workers' compensation statutes were urgent-
ly needed because the common law shielded the business defen-
126. Id at 306-08.
127. 614 A.2d 779 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
128. Spinabelli, 614 A.2d at 780. While the Dillon court equalized the burdens
of proof between employers and claimants in modification proceedings, it appears
that a claimant's bad faith in attempting to find employment would not entitle him
to this equal footing.
129. Id. at 779. The date of the claimant's original injury was December 22,
1981. Id. Finding that the claimant refused in bad faith to pursue this proffered job,
the referee modified the claimant's benefits on April 28, 1986. Id. The claimant did
not appeal this modification, but instead filed for a reinstatement of benefits on May
29, 1986. Id.
The claimant alleged that he had a change of heart and wanted to try the
job that the employer offered earlier. Id. The job was that of a car jockey (one who
moves cars around the lot) and was originally offered to the claimant by the employ-
er in May of 1984. Id. When the claimant asked the employer for the job, the em-
ployer told the claimant that the job was no longer available. Id.
The referee granted the claimant's petition for modification, reasoning that
the claimant made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with his
medical profile. Id. The referee concluded that it was the employer's fault that a
position was no longer available. Id.
The Board reversed, holding that once a claimant refused to try a position
offered by the employer, the employer was not required to maintain that position
indefinitely. Id. The commonwealth court affirmed the decision of the Board. Id. The
Board and the commonwealth court agreed that it was the claimant's bad faith, not
the disability, which adversely affected his earning power. Id.
130. Id. at 780.
131. See generally Torrey, cited at note 47, at 979-81.
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dants.3 2 The legislature was trying to give the employees a
fair fight against the powerful and ever-growing industrial em-
ployers. The goal of defending the worker would include ensur-
ing that every right afforded to an employer would be given to
the employees who were covered under the Act. However, this
design was not always followed, resulting in cases in which the
employee was required to satisfy a higher burden of proof than
the employer.
For example, the Zuro33 decision was the first case to limit
the employee's footing against the industrial employer by hold-
ing that a claimant who petitioned for an increased disability
award had to show that his physical condition had deteriorated
since the date of the award for partial disability." The court
later attempted to explain this rationale in Hendricks,5' which
held that it was the claimant's change of physical condition, not
the inability to find employment, that was the basis for a modifi-
cation of benefits.36
In Henderson,'3 7 as well as in numerous other cases, the
commonwealth court misinterpreted the meaning of the word
disability. The courts did not consider that while the claimant's
physical injury did not become worse, its lasting effects on the
claimant's ability to earn money could certainly intensify over
time. Until the Dillon decision, the Pennsylvania courts would
not allow claimants to modify their benefits unless they proved
either that the original injury deteriorated or had affected other
parts of the body."'8
However, the courts were not so strict with the employers,
even though the original intent of the Act was to lessen the
employee's burden of proof.'39 In Petrone40 and Kachinski4
132. See Keller v. Old Lycoming Twp., 428 A.2d 1358, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981).
133. Zuro v. McClintic Marshall Co., 195 A. 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937). See
notes 51-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Zuro decision.
134. Zuro, 195 A. at 161-62.
135. Hendricks v. Patterson, 67 A.2d 652 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949). See notes 60-68
and accompanying text for a discussion of the decision in Hendricks.
136. Hendricks, 67 A.2d at 655.
137. Henderson v. Air Master Corp., 276 A.2d 581 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971). See
notes 76-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Henderson.
138. See, e.g., Mancini, 440 A.2d at 1278.
139. The creation of the Workers' Compensation Act took away three of the
employer's affirmative defenses: assumption of the risk; contributory negligence; and
injury by fellow servant. Id.
140. Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 233 A.2d 891 (Pa. 1967). See notes 69-75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Petrone.
141. Kachinski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco Construction
Co.) 532 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1987). See notes 107-115 and accompanying text for a dis-
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that employers were not
required to meet the same burden as employees in order to mod-
ify the claimant's disability benefits."2 The Petrone decision
permitted employers to seek modification of the claimant's bene-
fits when there was evidence that proved the claimant was able
to do light work of a general nature."'
The Petrone decision favored the claimant only to the extent
that it removed the presumption that a claimant who was able
to work could have found a suitable job in the community. The
court in Kachinski held that the employer was required to prove
both that the claimant's physical condition improved and that
there was work available.1"
This line of cases did not balance the employer's burden with
that of the employee's in light of the Cerny1' decision. The
court held in Cerny that the claimant's burden of proof when
seeking to modify a partial disability award was to show both
that there was an increase in the disability since the partial
disability award and that the claimant was incapable of per-
forming the pre-injury position."4
The Pennsylvania courts provided no explanation as to why
there should be a different burden of proof in a modification
petition for the employer than for the claimant. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania used the Pieper147 decision to begin to
rebalance the burdens of proof between the employee and the
employer. In Pieper, the court held that a claimant who sought a
reinstatement of suspended benefits had no burden of proving a
causal connection between the original injury and his current
disability.'" The court properly recognized that the original
suspension was not based upon an improvement of the disability
and therefore the reinstatement of suspended benefits did not
cussion of Kachinski.
142. See Petrone, 233 A.2d at 894; Kachinski, 532 A.2d at 379.
143. See Petrone, 233 A.2d at 892.
144. Kachinski, 532 A.2d at 377. The Kachinski holding was modified by the
commonwealth court in Lukens to the extent that the employer was no longer re-
quired to prove a change in the claimant's physical condition in order to successfully
petition for modification. See Lukens, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Williams), 568 A.2d 981, 983 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). The commonwealth court in
Lukens allowed the employer to alter the benefits received by a claimant whose
disability was formerly adjudicated and was not in dispute in the petition for modifi-
cation. See Lukens, 568 A.2d at 983-84.
145. Cerny v. Schrader & Seyfried, Inc., 342 A.2d 384 (Pa. 1975). See notes 92-
99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the decision in Cerny.
146. Cerny, 342 A.2d at 387.
147. Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments, 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990). See
notes 116-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pieper.
148. See Pieper, 584 A.2d at 304.
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require evidence regarding that disability; rather, the claimant
had to show that the claimant's earning power was again affect-
ed adversely by the disability.
The Dillon decision employed the logic of Pieper and applied
its reasoning to that of a modification petition. By doing so, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania restored the balance between
the claimant and the employer. The court recognized that, un-
less a claimant acted in bad faith, as in Spinabelli,49 the
claimant should have been afforded the same opportunity to
modify the disability benefits from partial to total disability as
the employer.
Under the guise of policy, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
actually employed a two-pronged legal analysis that had the
effect of rebalancing the interests of employers and claimants.
The first was the clear distinction between the terms injury and
disability - a distinction that was blurred by the superior court
in Henderson.' Viewing these terms in their appropriate
characterizations, it is clear beyond peradventure that in order
for a claimant to prove a change in his disability, there could
never be an absolute requirement that he demonstrate a change
in his physical condition, as disability refers only to a change in
the claimant's earning power. Second, the issue of the burden of
proof between claimants and employers was clarified. The Dillon
court held that what was fair for employers was fair for claim-
ants. While critics of the Dillon holding would maintain that
this was a policy decision and should not have been made by the
court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania merely interpreted
the Act as intended by the legislature from its inception to the
present. The policy of the legislature was to put the employers
and the claimants on an equal footing."'1 It was also the duty
of the courts to correct a misapplication of law when the need
arose. Because this decision was rendered both under policy
considerations and precise legal analysis, it is unlikely to be
overruled.
This rather straightforward decision had the force of restruc-
turing the burdens of proof between the parties and returned
the claimant and the employer to the quasi-bargaining equilibri-
um that was intended by the original Workmen's Compensation
Act. 52 The inability to find employment appropriate in view of
149. See Spinabelli v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Massey Buick,
Inc.), 614 A.2d 779, 780 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). See notes 127-30 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Spinabelli.
150. See Henderson, 276 A.2d at 582.
151. See Torrey, cited at note 47, at 978.
152. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that it was incumbent upon
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one's medical limitations is as worthy of compensation as is a
recurrence of a physical injury. Dillon is a clear victory for the
disabled employee, who, in these times of scarce employment,
will likely not find a similar full-time job that would be as finan-
cially rewarding as that original position which rendered him
permanently disabled.
William B. Pentecost, Jr.
employers to make injured claimants whole. Kachinski, 532 A.2d at 380.
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